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RULE 68: Erie Go AGAIN-COSTS, ATroRNEYs' FEES, AND
PLAINTIFFS' OFFERS-SUBSTANCE OR PROCEDURE?
Cynthia L. Street*
I. INTRODUCTION
Eriel-a small word, but one that can produce post-traumatic stress symptoms
in attorneys, causing them to revert to their days as trembling law students in
first semester Civil Procedure. A sweeping new trend in state law is threatening
to cause problems once again in district court diversity cases. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 68 is an offer of judgment-a settlement device-to help unclog
overloaded court dockets. Rule 68, in its current form, is rarely used and does
not serve its intended purpose. States, not satisfied with the effectiveness of
Rule 68, have enacted rules of their own. These state rules may be in direct con-
flict with Federal Rule 68 and may cause Erie problems for federal courts sitting
in diversity.
This article addresses the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
variations and effectiveness of Federal Rule 68 and some state counterparts, the
analysis necessary for applying state or federal law in diversity cases in general,
and an analysis for the offer of judgment rules in federal courts. Specifically,
Part II of this article gives a brief overview of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("FRCP") and the analysis necessary for federal courts sitting in
diversity. Part III discusses FRCP 68, its elements, purposes, characteristics, and
effectiveness, as well as an introduction to states' reactions to FRCP 68 and its
ineffectiveness. Part IV shows how some federal district and circuit courts have
approached this issue to date. Finally, Part V provides a roadmap that courts may
use to handle this question under Erie.
II. FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
Federal courts have a duty "to ascertain and apply state law when deciding
cases within their diversity jurisdiction."2 Prior to 1938, federal courts sitting in
diversity followed the general rules of the state in which they sat but were not
bound by common law. This approach was due in part to early interpretation of
the Rules of Decision Act3 ("RDA"), as exemplified in the Swift doctrine.' The
RDA requires "use of state law when the difference between state and federal law
might substantially affect the outcome of the case.' ' s
* Associate, Brunini Grantham Grower & Hewes, Jackson, Mississippi; B.A. Western Illinois University, 1991;
M.F.A. University of Southern Mississippi, 1993; J.D. Mississippi College School of Law, 2000. The author
gratefully acknowledges Professor William H. Page's guidance and encouragement during the development of
this Comment.
i. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE § 37, at 155 (2nd ed.
1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994)).
3. The RDA is found at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994).
4. The Swift doctrine permitted federal courts to create "federal general common law" based upon a court's
own independent judgment as to what the common law of a state was or should have been for all areas of con-
duct not regulated directly by state statute. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
5. SHR.vE, supra note 2, at 155.
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The Swift doctrine, consisting of Swift v. Tyson' and its progeny, "permitted
federal judges to displace state law with federal common law simply because the
federal court's diversity jurisdiction had been invoked."7 The followers of the
Swift doctrine "hoped it would promote uniformity among state and federal
courts."'8 Although the Swift doctrine did promote uniformity among federal
courts, it resulted in a lack of uniformity between state and federal courts
because state law was continuously displaced. This split between state and feder-
al courts encouraged forum-shopping by creating a "regime in which the choice
of state or federal court might determine what substantive law would govern." 9
In 1938, the Supreme Court's decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins'" brought an
end to the reign of the Swift doctrine." The Supreme Court overruled Swift'
interpretation of the RDA, noting that "the uniformity of law sought by the advo-
cates of the Swift doctrine had not materialized." 2 What Swift actually did was
provide "non-citizens the forum-shopping advantage of invoking diversity juris-
diction to evade state common law rules, when plaintiffs who shared the citizen-
ship of their defendants could not."1" The same was true of non-resident defen-
dants who enjoyed the option of removal, while resident defendants did not.
The underlying purpose of the Erie doctrine was to avoid forum-shopping and
inequitable outcomes. In 1938, the same year that Erie was decided, Congress
adopted the FRCP" These rules "created a separate and distinctive code of pro-
cedure for federal courts in all cases, including diversity cases . . . .' Now,
when a federal court is faced with the issue of which law to use, either the RDA
and Erie or the FRCP under the Rules Enabling Act ("REA") governs the deci-
sion. When a conflict exists between a state rule or policy and the FRCP, the
REA controls. When the conflict is between a state rule or policy and a federal
rule or policy other than one of the FRCP, the RDA and Erie control.
The first question that must be answered when analyzing whether to apply
state or federal law'" is whether the RDA and Erie govern or whether a federal
rule of civil procedure and the REA govern. Under the RDA, 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1994), federal courts, in civil cases, must apply "[t]he laws of the several states,
except where the constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide."17
6. 41 U.S. I (1842).
7. SHREvE, supra note 2, § 38[B].
8. Id. at 157.
9. S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F3d 305, 309 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1010 (1995).
10. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
i1. SHREVE, supra note 2, § 38[C].
12. Id. at 158 (discussing Erie R.R.v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
13. SIt VE, supra note 2, § 38[C].
14. The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 delegated lawmaking authority to the Supreme Court to make rules
governing "general rules of practice and procedure" for cases in the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2071-74
(1994).
15. S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 309 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1010(1995).
16. This article does not deal with intrastate conflict of laws.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994) states, "[t]he laws of the several states, except where the constitution or treaties
of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." The REA is an "Act[] of Congress"
within the meaning of the RDA.
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The RDA and Erie provide a default rule. If there is no federal rule or statute
on point, then the court must ask whether the application of the federal policy
affects the outcome of the litigation in such a way that it would give an incentive
to a party to choose the federal court over the state court. This question is known
as the "outcome-determination" test as formulated in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York."8 If the answer to the outcome-determination test is "no," then there is no
"conflict," and the federal policy is applied. If the answer is "yes," that is, if fed-
eral policy would affect the likelihood of success, the court must then balance the
state's interest in having its procedures followed and the federal government's
interest in administering justice as an independent system.19 This analysis is
known as the Byrd balancing test, as formulated in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Cooperative, Inc.2" The balancing test essentially weighs the importance
of the state policy, the importance of the federal policy, and the extent to which
the outcome of the case will be affected. The greater the effect on the outcome,
the more likely it will be that state law will control.2"
If there is a federal rule or statute that is on point, then the REA controls the
analysis. In Hanna v. Plumer,22 the Supreme Court modified the Guaranty Trust
outcome-determination test. The Court held that because the outcome-determi-
nation argument was too literal-minded, it was more important to ask
whether application of the [state] rule would make so important a difference to
the character or result of the litigation that failure to enforce it would unfairly
discriminate against citizens of the forum state, or whether application of the
rule would have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the
litigants that failure to enforce it would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose
the federal court.23
Furthermore, in Hanna, the Supreme Court noted that the purpose of the Erie
doctrine was to (1) discourage forum-shopping, and (2) avoid inequitable admin-
istration of the laws." By finding rules that may be unfavorable to defendants
inapplicable in diversity cases, courts create an additional incentive for the
defendant to seek removal to federal court. The Court noted that trivial varia-
tions between the state and the federal rules are not likely to influence the deci-
sion to remove to federal court.
In order for Hanna to apply, the state rule must be valid and there must be a
direct conflict between a federal procedural rule and a state rule.2" Furthermore,
Erie was not meant to preclude forum-shopping entirely, only forum-shopping
that would result in different applications of substantive law or inequitable
administration of the law.2" Hanna focuses its analysis on the earliest phases of
18. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
19. Id.
20. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
21. Id.
22. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
23. Id. at 468 & n. 9.
24. Id. at 468.
25. Id. at 470.
26. Id.
2000)
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an action and looks to see if the conflicting rules or statutes will affect the out-
come or the size of the award. If the conflict is prospectively outcome-determi-
native, then a rule is valid unless it violates the REA. Hanna mandates that a
FRCP is valid if it does not exceed "the congressional mandate embodied in the
[REA] []or transgress[ ] constitutional bounds."2 In such a case, state law would
be subordinate to the federal rule. To date, no court has held any federal rule
invalid. Under Hanna, the rule is simple: so long as an applicable FRCP "is
constitutional and complies with the [REA]," the FRCP controls.28
Hanna controlled application of the Erie doctrine for fifteen years, but in
1980, with its decision in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., the Supreme Court shift-
ed from favoring federal law to favoring state law.29 In Walker," the Court did
not follow the approach it announced in Hanna because it found "no direct con-
flict between the Federal Rule and the state law."3 The Court held that, in order
for there to be a "direct" conflict, the application of the state rule would have to
"thwart some purpose the federal rule was intended to achieve. 32 Finding the
federal rule "not applicable" rather than "invalid," the Court held that Hanna did
not apply.3  Instead, the policies behind Erie controlled. Therefore, under
Walker, a court must determine if a seemingly applicable federal rule is broad
enough in scope; if not, the rule is simply not applicable. 5 If a rule is not applic-
able under Walker, then the analysis turns to the twin aims of Erie announced in
Hanna-to discourage forum-shopping and avoid inequitable administration of
the laws.
III. OFFERS OF SETTLEMENT RULES
The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 governs offers of judgment. Many
states have adopted this rule, or some variation of it. The language and applica-
tion of these state offer of judgment rules range from minor differences such as
slightly different wording to extreme differences in procedural, as well as sub-
stantive, rights and recoveries. These differences are causing some dissension in
the district courts.
A. FRCP 68
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to "serve
upon the [plaintiff] an offer to allow judgment to be taken against the [defendant]
for the money or property ... with costs then accrued." 6 If the plaintiff rejects
the offer and proceeds to trial, and he obtains a judgment that is less favorable
27. Id. at 464.
28. SIREVE, supra note 2, § 40[B].
29. Id.
30. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
31. Id. at 752.
32. Id.
33. !d. at 748.
34. Id. at 751.
35. Id.
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
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than the offer the defendant made, the plaintiff loses the costs he would have
received as part of his judgment. The plaintiff also has to pay the defendant's
costs that accrued after the date of the offer. Basically, under Rule 68, the plain-
tiff in this situation should have taken the offer and saved both the defendant and
himself the additional costs of going to trial.
Rule 68 only allows defendants to make this offer. Plaintiffs cannot make an
offer or a counter-offer. Additionally, the defendant does not receive costs when
he wins outright; the plaintiff must receive a favorable judgment, but the judg-
ment must be less favorable than the offer the defendant made.
The rule is essentially a rule of procedure-not only because the rule is one of
federal civil procedure, but because it outlines the procedure a litigant must fol-
low to make an offer and receive costs." The stated purpose of the rule was to
"discourage[]... protracted litigation and vexatious lawsuits,'.., lessen the bur-
den on an already taxed justice system,"38 and "to significantly increase the
incentives for settlement by attaching financial penalties (through a cost-shifting
mechanism) to the rejection of a settlement offer that was eventually proven (by
the verdict) to have been reasonable."39 The rule does not create a cause of
action. It only provides a tool by which an early settlement can be achieved and
costs can be recovered once a cause of action is initiated in court. Rule 68 is a
rule of "devices intended to provide incentives for parties to conclude disputes at
an early stage when the outcomes are reasonably predictable.""
Rule 68 is not tied to an underlying cause of action. Any defendant may
employ Rule 68 in federal court. Rule 68 tells a defendant (1) when to make an
offer, (2) how to make an offer, (3) what the offer must contain to be valid, (4)
how long the offer must remain open, (5) what to do with an accepted offer, and
(6) how to get "costs" after an offer has been rejected.' 1
B. State Versions of Rule 68
Many states have adopted FRCP 68 or some version of it. Many other states,
frustrated with the ineffectiveness of FRCP 68, have enacted alternative offer of
judgment rules or statutes. While the federal rule was intended to provide a
mechanism to help relieve strained court dockets by creating incentives for par-
ties to settle at an early stage of litigation, FRCP 68 is rarely utilized. The
amount of "costs" that are cut off and shifted are negligible and fail both to pro-
vide an incentive for one party to even make an offer and for the other party to
seriously consider the offer.
37. FRCP 68 and applicable state rules mentioned in this article are appended.
38. LESLIE S. BONNEY ET AL., Rule 68: Awakening a Sleeping Giant, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 379, 380
(1997) (citing Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1277 (6th Cir. 1991)).
39. BONNEY ET AL., supra note 36, at 380 (citing Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981)).
40. JAY N. VARON, Promoting Settlements and Limiting Litigation Costs by Means of the Offer of Judgment:
Some Suggestions for Using and Revising Rule 68, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 813, 816 (1984) (citing Delta Air Lines,
Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 356 (1981)).
41. See FED. R. CIv. P. 68.
2000]
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Several states, through adoption, amendment and court interpretation, have
attempted to make the rule more accessible by providing more incentives for par-
ties to settle and mandating harsher consequences for rejecting an offer. 2 Some
states allow both plaintiffs and defendants to make offers." Others allow pre-
vailing defendants to recover costs." Some states' rules are self-executing or
mandatory, while others leave a determination of the costs up to the discretion of
the court. Some states allow the offeror to recover under a much broader defini-
tion of costs than is employed by the federal rule-including attorneys' fees,
double costs, expert witness fees, traveling expenses for additional depositions,
and enhanced prejudgment interest."'
States' rules broadly defining costs typically have two parts. The first part is
similar to the federal rule in that it, like FRCP 68, is procedural in nature, that is,
it tells a party how, when, where and to whom to make an offer. In addition, the
first part lists the procedural requirements that one must follow in order to com-
ply with the rule and to recover costs if a settlement is not reached. The second
part of the rule is generally more substantive in nature, that is, it creates in the
offeror a right to a significant amount of money. This amount to which the offer-
or is entitled in the event that the offeree does not settle, can and will affect the
outcome of the case and the amount of judgment that can be obtained. For
example, a "state law denying the right to attorneys' fees or giving a right thereto
... reflects a substantial policy of the State ... ." Courts have also determined
that statutes regarding prejudgment interest are substantive in nature."7
IV DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS THAT HAVE ADDRESSED THE ISSUE
OF APPLYING STATE RULES IN FEDERAL COURTS
As one court has noted, "[tlhe applicability of state procedural rules in federal
diversity litigation is a knotty issue."' 8 Whether, or how, these amendments will
42. See Alaska (ALASKiA R. R.C.P. 68)(ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.065 (Lexis 1962)); Arizona (ARiz. ST. R.C..
68); California (CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 998 (West 2000)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-17-202
(Bradford 1999)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ch. 768.79)(FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.061 (West 1983))(FLA. ST. R.C.P.
1.442); Louisiana (LA. CODE Civ. PROC. ANN. art. 970 (West 1972)); Michigan (MICH. R. R.C.P. M.C.R.
2.405); Minnesota (MN. R. Civ. P. 68); Nevada (NE. R.C.P 68); New Jersey (N.J. R. SUPER. TAX SuRu. CTs.
R. Civ. P. 4:58-1, 2-4); North Dakota (N.D. R. Ctv. P. 68); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § I101.1 (West
1991)); Tennessee (TENN. R. R.C.P. 68); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. § 807.01 (West 1994)); Wyoming (Wy. R.
R.C.P. 68).
43. See, e.g., MrmN. R. Civ. P 68.
44. See, e.g., TENN. R. R.C.P. 68.
45. See, e.g., NEv. R.C.P. 68.
46. Tanker Management v. Brunson, 918 F.2d 1524, 1528 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980)). See also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991), reh 'g denied, 501 U.S.
1269 (1991) (holding that a rule shifting attorneys' fees to a losing party is substantive for purposes of deter-
mining whether it applies in a diversity suit); Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985); DAVID L. KAN, The 1996
Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442: Reconciling a Decade of Confusion, 71 -AUG FLA. B.J.
32, 35 (July/Aug. 1997) (citing In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 682 So. 2d 105, 105-06
(Fla. 1996) and quoting Timmons v. Combs, 608 So. 2d 1, 2-3 (Fla. 1992) (stating that, "[ilt is clear that the
circumstances under which a party is entitled to costs and attorney's fees is substantive and that our rule can
only control procedural matters.")).
47. Home Indemnity Co. v. Lane Powell Moss and Miller, 43 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Northrop
Corp. v. Triad Int'l Mktg. S.A., 842 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1988) for the proposition that "[slubstantive state
law determines the rate of prejudgment interest in diversity actions.").
48. S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F3d 305, 309 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1010 (1995).
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affect diversity actions in federal courts is a question that must eventually be
answered. Should a court sitting in diversity apply the state rule? If state law is
not applied, and a non-resident defendant need only remove to federal court in
order to avoid the adverse effect of a plaintiff's offer to settle, will the purpose of
the rule be undermined? Does the removal option not affect forum-shopping?
A. Wisconsin District Courts and the Seventh Circuit
Wisconsin's version of Rule 68 is codified at section 807.01 of the Wisconsin
Statutes."9 Wisconsin is one of sixteen states that currently allow plaintiffs to
make offers ofjudgrnent50 The purpose behind the Wisconsin statute is the same
as the underlying purpose of FRCP 68: "to encourage settling cases before
trial."51
In 1983, the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin consistently
applied the federal rule, holding that since the state rule "is a procedural rule, not
of substantive state law, the offer has no effect in this court." 2 In both
Hutchinson v. Burning Hills Steel Co., 3 and Klawes v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co.,"4 the district court granted the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's set-
tlement offer. While acknowledging that each party's arguments "would make
for interesting debate," the district court concluded that Rule 68, and, therefore,
section 807.01 of the Wisconsin Statutes, was "clearly procedural," despite plain-
tiffs' efforts to envelop it in the cloak of substance. 5 The court apparently deter-
mined-without much more than a knee-jerk reaction and a cursory glance-that
section 807.01 of the Wisconsin Statutes, was procedural, and since the FRCP
had a valid rule "on point," the federal rule applied without any further analysis.
Five years later, the Western District of Wisconsin reached the opposite con-
clusion. The court, in Datapoint Corp. v. M & I Bank of Hilldale," held that
because FRCP 68 was narrower in scope than Wisconsin's rule, it was not applic-
able. Thus, under Erie, the court was compelled to apply the state rule in diversi-
ty.
In analyzing this issue, the court looked to the Supreme Court's analysis in
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.7 Essentially, Walker requires a court to consider
two initial questions when determining whether a rule is substantive or procedur-
al: (1) is a federal rule sufficiently broad enough to control the issue, and, 8 if
not; (2) is the statute applicable under the principles of Erie."9 The district court
49. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 807.01 in its entirety appended. All state rules, whether they are rules of court or
codified in statues, whether they are labeled "offer of judgment:' "offer of settlement," or something else, may
be referred to as "state's offer of judgment rules," or "state's Rule 68."
50. See NEv. R.C.P. 68 for an example of state rules which permit plaintiffs to make offers of judgment.
5I. STEPHEN K. WARCH, Meeting Head On: Offers of Settlement and an Insurer s Potential Bad Faith, Wis.
LAW. 69, Oct. 1996, at 10-11.
52. Hutchinson v. Burning Hills Steel Co., 559 F Supp. 553 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
53. Id.
54. 572 F. Supp. 116 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
55. Id. at 119.
56. 665 F. Supp. 722 (WD. Wis. 1987).
57. Id. at 728 (discussing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 748 (1980)).
58. Datapoint, 665 F Supp. at 728.
59. Dillingham-Healy-Grow-Dew v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewage Dist., 796 F Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Wis.
1992).
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for the Western District of Wisconsin rejected the "on point" language used by
the Eastern District of Wisconsin in both Hutchinson"0 and Klawes"1 and found
that the "sufficiently broad in scope" language found in Walker was controlling. 2
Once a determination is made that the federal rule is not on point, invalid or nar-
rower in scope than the state rule, the court should focus on the principles of
Erie."3
The district court found that, because FRCP 68 does not encompass offers
made by plaintiffs, it is therefore narrower in scope than section 807.01 of the
Wisconsin Statutes. Thus, the court must "determine whether the principles of
Erie ... require application of Wis. Stat. § 807.01(4) in this case.""' The intent
of Erie was to ensure that the outcome of litigation in diversity cases would be
the same in federal court as it would be in state court."5 Because the amount the
plaintiff would be entitled to recover would be greater under the state rule than
the federal rule, the court held that there was a sufficient difference in outcome
to view the rule as one of substance rather than procedure.66
Five years later, in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, the court followed the
analysis of the Western District in Dillingham-Healy-Grow-Dew v. Milwaukee
Metropolitan Sewerage District67 and held that the "Wisconsin statute could be
used in federal court in [a] diversity action where no federal rule of civil proce-
dure was broad enough to control the issue and failure to apply [the Wisconsin]
statute would mean that [a] different result would be reached in federal court
than in state court."6 The court denied the defendant's motion to strike the
offers of settlement and held that "[in diversity actions, Wis. Stat. § 807.01(3)
and (4) may be utilized in federal court.""9
Finally, in 1995, the question of which law to apply reached the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage
District." Chief Judge Posner pointed out that a rule that seems procedural in
the ordinary sense may be deemed substantive if the application or non-applica-
tion of the rule will affect the outcome of the case." Unfortunately, there is "no
clear criterion" for deciding whether a rule should be labeled "substantive" or
"procedural" when determining if a state rule should be applied in federal diver-
sity actions. 2
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that there are two situations in
which a court must decide which rule to apply. First, when there is a direct con-
flict between the federal and state rule, the federal rule must be applied 3 if
60. Hutchinson v. Burning Hills Steel Co., 559 E Supp. 553 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
61. Klawes v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co,, 572 E Supp. 116 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
62. Datapoint, 665 F. Supp. at 728.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 729.
65. Id. at 728 (citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 745 (1980)).
66. Datapoint, 665 F. Supp. at 728.
67. 796 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Wis. 1992).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1193.
70. 60 F.3d 305 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1010 (1995).
71. Id. at 309 (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)).
72. S.A Healy, 60 E3d at 309.
73. Id.
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enforcing the state rule would, in effect, invalidate the federal rule.' Second,
when "the state procedural rule, though undeniably 'procedural' in the ordinary
sense of the term, is limited to a particular substantive area, such as contract law
* . . or tort law,""8 the federal court should apply the state rule. Otherwise, the
"state's [manifest] intention to influence substantive outcomes would be defeated
by allowing parties to shift their litigation into federal court .... ,"6 The offer of
judgment rule does not fall clearly into either category.
The Seventh Circuit held that there was not a direct conflict between the feder-
al and state rule because the Wisconsin rule encompassed offers made by plain-
tiffs, and the federal rule is limited to defendants only." The court also pointed
out that the Wisconsin rule "is not confined to any particular area of the law
[, and, while] ... the rule does not have substantive goals in [an] obvious sense,"
the rule's effect on the amount of recovery does tend to be a "substantive" conse-
quence.78
To determine the extent of the "substantive" consequences, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, like the district court in Datapoint,79 followed the two part
analysis set forth in Walker.' The court held that under the mandate of Walker,
the "application of the Wisconsin rule in diversity cases would be consistent with
the principles of Erie and the Rules Enabling Act."" The court likened the state
rule to that of a rule or statute that allows for punitive damages or attorneys fees,
and noted that the allowance of punitive damages, even though "not limited to a
particular class of cases . . . [is] applicable in diversity suits ... ."' The court
also noted that in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,' the United States Supreme Court
held that a "rule shifting attorneys' fees to a losing party is 'substantive' for pur-
poses of determining whether it applies in a diversity suit ..."-
The current view in the Seventh Circuit is that the federal offers of judgment
rule is not sufficiently broad enough to control the issue because it does not
encompass offers made by plaintiffs. Thus, there is no direct conflict between
the Wisconsin rule and the federal rule. Plaintiffs in Wisconsin federal courts
under diversity jurisdiction may, therefore, make offers of judgment pursuant to
section 807.01 of the Wisconsin Statutes. The Seventh Circuit has held, however,
that if a defendant wishes to make an offer, there is a direct conflict between
FRCP 68 and the state rule." The defendant must, therefore, make his offer pur-
suant to FRCP 68 and not pursuant to the Wisconsin rule.", This reasoning does
not impair the function of FRCP 68.
74. Id. (citing Burlington Northern Ry. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1,4-5 (1987)).




79. Datapoint Corp. v. M & I Bank of Hilldale, 665 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Wis. 1987).
80. S.A. Healy, 60 F3d at 309 (discussing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 745 (1980)).
81. S.A. Healy, 60 E3d at 311.
82. Id. (citing In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F2d 594, 606 (7th Cir. 1981)).
83. 501 U.S. 32 (1991), rehg denied, 501 U.S. 1269(1991).
84. S.A. Healy, 60 F3d at 311 (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52-3 (1991), reh g denied,
501 U.S. 1269 (1991)).
85. S.A. Healy, 60 F3d at 311.
86. Id. at 312.
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B. Florida District Courts and the Eleventh Circuit
The leading case in the Eleventh Circuit, Tanker Management, Inc. v.
Brunson,87 involved Florida's offer of judgment rules." Unlike the Seventh
Circuit, which held that only plaintiffs could make an offer pursuant to
Wisconsin's state rule, the Eleventh Circuit found that both plaintiffs and defen-
dants could make offers of judgment pursuant to Florida's state rule." In Tanker,
the defendant made an offer pursuant to the state rule and wanted to collect costs
under the state rule rather than the federal rule." Florida's rule allows for much
broader recovery than does the federal rule. 1 The Middle District of Florida held
that the state rule allowing for recovery of attorneys' fees was not preempted by
the federal rule; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.92
Florida also allows defendants who make an offer to recover costs when the
defendant wins outright. The availability of this recovery is in stark contrast to
the recovery permitted by the federal rule, which limits recovery to cases in
which the plaintiff wins but recovers less than the offer.93 At the close of the
plaintiff's case in chief, in Tanker, the defendant moved for, and the court grant-
ed, a directed verdict.9 ' The defendant had previously made an "offer of settle-
ment pursuant to F.S.A. § 45.061, an offer of judgment pursuant to F.S.A. §
768.79 and an offer of judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.""s After judg-
ment for the defendant was entered, the defendant filed an application for costs
and attorneys' fees, which the district court granted.9"
The plaintiff appealed contending, inter alia, that "the district court erred by...
awarding Brunson [defendant] costs and attorney's fees."9" Attorneys' fees are not
recoverable under FRCP 68 "unless the underlying statute that creates the cause of
action expressly provides that attorney's fees are recoverable as costs.""
However, section 45.061 of the Florida Statutes provides "that a prevailing defen-
dant may recover attorney's fees if the plaintiff unreasonably rejected either a set-
tlement offer or an offer of judgment."99
The plaintiff contended that the offer of judgment rules were procedural, and
therefore, FRCP 68 preempted section 45.061 of the Florida Statutes under
Erie."°c Like the Seventh Circuit, however, the Eleventh Circuit held that the two
87. 918 F.2d 1524 (1lth Cir. 1990).
88. Florida has three rules regarding offers of judgment: (1) FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.79 "Offer of judgment
and demand for judgment"; (2) FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.061 (West 1983) "Offers of settlement"; and (3) FLA. ST.
R.C.P. 1.442 "Proposals for Settlement." These rules, which overlap and conflict with one another, have led to
much confusion in practice in the Florida court system.
89. Tanker Management, Inc., 918 F2d at 1526-28.
90. Id. at 1524.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981) (holding that a prevailing defendant cannot
recover costs pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 68).




98. Id. (citing Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985)).
99. Tanker Management, Inc., 918 F2d, at 1528 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 1526.
[VOL. 20:341
Rule 68: Erie Go Again-Substance or Procedure?
rules were not in "direct collision" because FRCP 68 was not broad enough in
scope to cover the issue of a plaintiff's unreasonable objection.101 The court also
noted that a "state law denying the right to attorney's fees or giving a right there-
to... reflects a substantial policy of the state, [and] should be followed."'02 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of attorneys' fees and costs to
the prevailing defendant.
The federal courts in Florida, therefore, have held that Florida's offer of judg-
ment rules are not preempted (or displaced) by FRCP 68.103 The federal courts in
Florida, as well as the Eleventh Circuit, have held that both plaintiffs and defen-
dants may make offers pursuant to the Florida rules instead of FRCP 68, since
the potential recovery is substantially greater under the state rule.' 0 ' This holding
is different from that of the Seventh Circuit and the Wisconsin federal courts,
which have stated that plaintiffs may make offers pursuant to the state rule, but
defendants must make their offers pursuant to the federal rule, since that portion
of the state rule is directly covered by, and therefore in conflict with, the federal
rule.
C. The Ninth Circuit and Various District Courts within the Ninth Circuit
Within the Ninth Circuit, Alaska, California and Nevada currently have state
Offer of Judgment rules or statutes that differ from FRCP 68. '0 Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure 68 allows plaintiffs to make offers and also allows for reasonable
attorneys' fees and a stepped-up rate of prejudgment interest as specified in sec-
tion 09.30.065 of the Alaska Statutes.0 6 In Home Indemnity Co. v. Lane Powell
Moss and Miller,"7 the Ninth Circuit held that Alaska's statute, which allows for
enhanced prejudgment interest, was inapplicable in diversity cases. The court
held, however, that Alaska's general prejudgment statute must be applied in
diversity cases because it was a rule of substantive law.'0 8 The court further held
that section 09.30.065 of the Alaska Statutes was "not a prejudgment interest
statute; it addresses the procedures for and consequences of making offers of
judgment"'0 ' Prejudgment interest statutes are normally compensatory rules and
not penalties, whereas section 09.30.065 of the Alaska Statutes "is punitive in
nature," punishing an offeree for not settling when the final judgment indicates
that he should have settled. ' The court held that the district court did not err in
101. Id. (citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980)).
102. Tanker Management, Inc., 918 E2d at 1526 (quoting 6 JEREMY C. MooRE ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
54.77[2], 1712-1713 (2d ed. 1974) (footnotes omitted)).
103. Tanker Management, Inc., 918 F2d at 1526-28.
104. Id.
105. See Florida rules appended.
106. This rule is applicable to all cases filed before August 7, 1997. ALASKA R.R.C.P. 68, as amended
through Sept. 1, 1999 is applicable to all cases filed on or after August 7, 1997, and is almost identical to its
predecessor, except that it does not direct one to ALAsKA STAT. § 09.30.065 (Lexis 1962) but incorporated the
language of the statute into the rule.
107. 43 F3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1995).
108. Id. (citing Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int'l Mktg. S.A., 842 E2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1988) for the proposi-
tion that "(s]ubstantive state law determines the rate of prejudgment interest in diversity actions.").
109. Home Indemnity Co., 43 F3d at 1322.
110. Id.
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holding that FRCP 68 controlled because section 09.30.065 of the Alaska
Statutes could not "be characterized as a substantive prejudgment interest
statute"; it is a procedural offer of judgment provision."
Later that year, the Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to address a similar issue
stemming from a California case. California's offer of judgment rule is codified
at section 998 of the California Civil Procedure Code and allows for an offeror to
recover actual expert witness fees. 12 Under "[f]ederal law ... the defendant...
[can only] recover forty dollars per day per witness."1" In Aceves v. Allstate
Insurance Co., the Ninth Circuit held that state "law controls the substance of
[the] lawsuit, but federal law controls the procedure."'1 4 This proposition is true
unless applying the federal law creates an incentive to forum-shop." ' With little
explanation, the court noted that it would be "exceedingly unlikely that section
1821(b) [would] provide[ ] litigants an incentive to sue in or remove to federal
courts."1 6
Nevada's offer of judgment rule allows, inter alia, plaintiffs to make offers of
settlement and to recover attorneys' fees."' The District Court of Nevada, in
Nicolaus v. West Side Transport, Inc.,"8 held that the plaintiff (intervenor) could
not utilize the Nevada procedural rule to support its claim for post-offer costs.119
The court agreed with the Seventh Circuit's holding in S.A. Healy2 ' that the sub-
stantive portion of the state rule allowing plaintiffs to make an offer must be
applied in diversity cases, or defendants would have a heightened incentive to
remove.12" ' The court also held, however, that to allow a recovery of attorneys'
fees "would transgress the limits of Erie."'22 The court held that allowing a plain-
tiff-offeror to recover attorneys' fees would create "a disincentive to removal by
out-of-state defendants who would otherwise desire the protection and alacrity
offered by a federal court."'' 3 The court called this approach a "limited accep-
tance of Nevada Rule 68 into diversity cases."'"' This acceptance "reflects a bal-
ance between maintaining the integrity of the congressionally sponsored Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure . . . and observing 'important state interests and regula-
tory policies.' "125
The Ninth Circuit's analysis differs from the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits'
analysis in that the Ninth Circuit focused primarily on the substance/procedure
111. Id.
112. CAL. CtV. PROC. CODE § 998(c)(1).
113. Aceves v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 E3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) (1994)).
114. Aceves, 68 E3d at 1167.
115. Id. at 1168.
116. Id.
117. NEv. R.C.P. 68.
118. 185 F.R.D. 608 (D. Nev. 1999).
119. Id.
120. 60 F3d 305, 309 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1010 (1995).
121. Nicolaus, 185 F.R.D. at613.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 614.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) and quoting Gasperini v. Center
for Humanities, Inc. 518 U.S. 415 (1996)).
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characterization, rather than the "broad enough in scope" language of Walker."'
Determining that offer of judgment rules are procedural, the Ninth Circuit held
that the federal rule must prevail.
V. ANALYSIS OF RULE 68 UNDER Erie
If the federal court will not apply the state rule because it is a rule of proce-
dure, two problems emerge. First, if a plaintiff wishes to make an offer of judg-
ment, he will have to forum-shop, selecting the state court over the federal court
in order to make an offer. In turn, the non-resident defendant can remove to fed-
eral court in order to remove the plaintiff's right to make an offer of judgment.
Second, the inapplication of the state rule discriminates against resident defen-
dants because only a non-resident defendant can remove to federal court. If a
rule encourages forum-shopping, it is prospectively outcome-determinative.
Stating that a rule is outcome-determinative does not only affect who will win,
but it also affects the amount to which the winner is entitled. The state rules dis-
cussed in this article allow plaintiffs to make offers that can have a definite effect
on the monetary recovery of the case if they are not accepted.12 Many of these
state rules allow for attorneys' fees, expert witness costs, double costs, and
enhanced pre-judgment interests.128 Many state rules also allow a defendant to
recover these costs even if he or she prevails. 2' The federal rule only allows the
defendant to make an offer, and he cannot recover if he prevails at trial."3 The
only costs recoverable are those allowed by FRCP 54131
The question then becomes whether the differences between FRCP 68 and
state offer of judgment rules are differences that would either render the FRCP
"inapplicable" or cause the state and federal rules to "directly collide." The fed-
eral and state rules directly collide if the application of the state rule would ren-
der the federal rule useless or thwart the purposes behind the federal rule. If the
rules directly collide, Hanna mandates application of the federal rule. '32 If they
do not, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits suggest that the federal rule would be
inapplicable because it is outcome-determinative.
A federal rule of procedure is valid if it does not violate the REA. 33 The REA
limits federal rulemaking to procedural rules. 4 Holding a rule inapplicable dif-
fers from holding a rule invalid. To date, no rule of federal civil procedure has
126. Aceves v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 1995).
127. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 998 (West 2000); FLA. STAT. AiN. § 13-17-102 (West 1983); NEv. R.C.P. 68;
Wis. STAT ANN. § 807.01 (West 1994).
128. See, e.g., NEV. R.C.P. 68.
129. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.061 (West 1972).
130. See FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
131. Those costs include: (I) fees of the clerk and marshall; (2) fees of the court reporter for all or any part
of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) fees and disbursements for printing
and witnesses; (4) fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5)
docket fees; and (6) compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees
expenses, and costs of special interpretation services.
132. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
133. Id. at 471.
134. Id.
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been held invalid. Federal rules, however, have been held inapplicable in certain
situations. 
13 1
At this point, as discussed in the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits analysis, two
questions must be asked under Walker: (1) is the federal rule sufficiently broad
to control the issue; (2) if not, then under Erie the statute is applicable . 3  The
state offer of judgment rules allow for plaintiffs' offers-the federal rule does
not. 137 Some of the state rules allow prevailing defendants to recover costs-the
federal rule does not."" Many of the state rules allow attorneys' fees, enhanced
prejudgment interest, expert witness fees, and double costs, all of which are enti-
tlements so bound up in the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties
that they must be substantive in the outcome-determination sense, and are not
governed by the FRCP and REA.'' The federal rule, then, must be construed as
narrow in scope and not able to cover these issues of recovery adequately-lead-
ing to an inequitable administration of the laws, forbidden by Erie.
Under the RDA and Erie, the rule must be analyzed under Guaranty Trust v.
York'" to determine whether it is outcome-determinative. The analysis is essen-
tially the same as that in Hanna. The court, in Guaranty Trust, first articulated
the outcome-determinative test: "a state law rule that substantially determines
the outcome of the litigation must be applied." ' The failure to apply these state
rule examples would promote forum-shopping. In this situation, the federal
rule's sole purpose is to encourage early settlement and avoid protracted litiga-
tion, thereby cleaning up the federal docket. If the state rules were not applied in
federal diversity cases, a non-resident defendant would have an incentive not to
settle and to remove to federal court, creating more litigation in federal courts.
Here, the failure to apply the state rule would promote forum-shopping and ren-
der the federal rule ineffective.
Conversely, the application of the state rule in federal court actually would
enhance the probability of parties settling before trial. Application of the state
rule would keep the federal dockets clear in two ways. First, if the case is initial-
ly filed in state court, and the parties know that the federal court will apply the
state rule, the incentive for defendants to remove to federal court would disap-
pear. Second, assuming that the more extreme state rules do encourage settle-
ment more than the federal rule does, even if parties begin in federal court or
remove to federal court due to the heightened risk of not settling, the parties are
more likely to settle prior to trial. Either way, the purpose of the federal rule is
enhanced by the application of the state rule in federal court. The failure to
135. See generally Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996); Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) (holding
in each case at least parts of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure inapplicable).
136. See S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 309 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1010 (1995); Tanker Management v. Brunson, 918 E2d 1254, 1528 (11th Cir. 1990).
137. Compare, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 807.01 with FED. R. CIrv. P. 68.
138. Compare, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.061 (West 1983) with FED. R. Ctv. P. 68.
139. See, e.g., NEv. R.C.P. 68.
140. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (emphasis in original).
141. Id. at 99 (noting that an amount recovered is included within the meaning of outcome).
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apply the state rule would thwart the purpose of the federal rule and would create
more litigation in federal courts.
In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric,14 ' the Supreme Court balanced the state
interest in having its law followed against the federal interest in administering
justice as an independent system." 3 The federal interest must be related to a
"strong federal policy" to outweigh the state interest. 4" Here, these states went
to great lengths to enact and amend these rules. They have a great interest in
reducing protracted litigation and maintaining control over their court systems.
They also have a great interest in making sure their residents are not subjected to
discrimination just because they are in federal court (as with a diverse plaintiff)
or because they cannot get to federal court (as with a non-diverse defendant).
Furthermore, the application of these state rules does not diminish the federal
court's interest in maintaining practice and pleading in its court. If anything, the
application of these rules is more likely to encourage settlement prior to litiga-
tion, thereby keeping the parties out of federal court and the federal docket clear.
Encouraging settlement is in accord with the federal policy behind FRCP 68.
Applying a state's offer of judgment rule will not thwart the purpose underlying
the federal rule if the state's rule promotes settlement.
VI. CONCLUSION
Following the two prong analysis set out in Walker, the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits' handling of the Wisconsin and Florida rules, and the analysis outlined
above, a federal court, sitting in diversity in a state with an amended Rule 68 or
similar statute must apply the state rule. Application of the state rule is the only
way to avoid disparate outcomes between state and federal judgments, forum-
shopping, favoring out-of-state defendants to the detriment of in-state defen-
dants, and to effectuate the stated purposes of both the state and federal offer of
judgment rules-that of encouraging settlement and avoiding protracted litiga-
tion. If removal can be used as a- tactic whereby defendants can avoid settling
and shift costs, the purpose behind FRCP 68 will be thwarted.
Louisiana has a rule that allows plaintiffs to make offers of judgment. To date,
the issue of its application in diversity has not been litigated in Louisiana federal
courts. Currently Mississippi is considering adopting a rule similar to those
addressed in this article. This issue will eventually find its way to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Without the Supreme Court stepping in to clean up the
obvious discrepancies among the Circuits, the Fifth Circuit will have to address
this issue. The District Courts of Mississippi and Louisiana, as well as the Fifth
Circuit, should look to the aims of Erie and its progeny to avoid forum-shopping,
discrimination, and disparate outcomes by applying the state's rule in diversity.
142. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Coop. Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
143. Id. at 537.
144. Id. at 538.
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